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Negligence Versus Strict Liability:
The Case of Underwriter Liability in IPO's
Noam Sher*

ABSTRACT:

[The present articlefocuses on the following question: What degree
of liability should be imposed on the leader of the consortium of underwriters (leader) and on the other underwritersof initialpublic offerings (IPO's) for misleading details in the offering prospectus negligence or strict liability? The article explores new justifications
for imposing liability in terms of negligence ratherthan strict liability.
In a model representing the problem of hidden actions by the firm
and the leader, leading to a moral hazard problem, the present article
demonstrates that the negligence rule has advantages over the strict
liability rule. The justifications derived from this model focus on the
fact that a negligence rule serves the law's function in serving the
moral hazardproblem optimally, since the rule only obliges the court
to ask whether the leader has indeed carriedout an optimal due diligence. Moreover, a negligence rule also assists the law optimally in
reducing costs due to the effect of the due diligence procedure on
third parties, contributes to the creation of a standard due diligence
procedure, and has an external positive effect on the private capital
raising market.
In an additional model presenting IPO pricing using the bookbuilding method, the leader manages to reach an equilibrium in
which she convinces an optimal number of permanent investors to
invest in collecting information about the offered security's value.
This model shows that the negligence rule is preferable to the strict
liability rule, as it helps convince various investors that the leader indeed made the optimal effort in executing due diligence, and therefore
allows them to reduce the costs of maintaining the testing and verification system, while at the same time increasing certainty as to the
accuratenessof the market demand curve presented by the leader. In
addition, a negligence rule better serves the post-IPO market in dealing with strategic actions by the leader intended to maximize the latter's profits in that market.
A further justficationfocuses on the leader'sinsurance role, and on
her ability to be the IPO's "least expensive insurer." Arguably, hold* Assistant Professor of Law (Lecturer), Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center

(IDC) Herzliya. J.S.D.; LL.M.; M.A. (Economics); LL.B.; and B.A. (Economics), Tel-Aviv
University.

452

DEPAUL BUSINESS

&

COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:451

ing the leader liable for negligence can add to the efficiency of the
market risk distribution system.
Finally, the above justificationsfor holding underwriters liable for
negligence also apply, at least in part, to the firm and its directors.
Additionally, they may have certain implications on laws regarding
IPO's, and theirproper scope should also be examined in other areas
where legal scholars argue for either negligence or strict liability as
the optimal basis for liability.]
I.

INTRODUCTION

The present article focuses on finding answers to the following
questions: Based on an economic analysis of law, what degree of liability should be imposed on the leader of the consortium of underwrit-

ers ("leader") and on the other underwriters of initial public offerings
(IPO's) for misleading details in the offering prospectus: negligence or
strict liability? Further, what can be learned, generally, from the
choice between negligence and strict liability?

A significant part of the discussion pertaining to the economic analysis of tort law focuses on the liability regimes that should be applied
in various circumstances. The main question concerns how a regime of
no liability, negligence (together with a contributory negligence rule,

or without it), or absolute liability (together or without contributory
negligence) can affect, in the same case, the precaution and activity
levels of potential offenders, and those of potential injurers. 1 This article also examines whether a negligence standard used to determine
underwriter liability, in the present American legal system, is preferable to a strict liability standard, assuming that underwriter liability is
2
preferable to no underwriter liability at all.

1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179 - 235 (5th ed., Aspen Law
1998); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Richard A. Posnerr, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. OF LEG. STUD. 205(1973); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-45 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); R. COOTER & T. ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 287-371 (Reading & Others, 3d ed., 2000). For a list of several dozens of
articles on the distinction between strict liability and negligence, based on economic analysis of
the law, see H. B. SCHAFER & A. SCHONENBERGER, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (B. Bouckaert & G. De-Geest eds. 1999) available at http://
allserv.rug.ac.be/-gdegeest/3100book.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
2. Elsewhere, we have presented the justifications for holding the leader and other IPO underwriters liable. See Noam Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's: Deterrence in a Double
Moral Hazard Model (Working Paper 2005); Noam Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's:
An Economic Analysis (forthcoming in 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L
(2006)). For more on
recent studies in the area, see infra Section III.
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Recent studies argue that strict liability should be applied to gatekeepers in the IPO market, including underwriters. 3 According to author F. Partnoy,4 the appropriate underwriter liability regime is strict
liability with a rule-changing option. According to his suggestion, underwriters should be required to compensate for each damage for
which it is determined, whether by judicial decision or way of compromise, that the issuing company should indemnify the investors. The
underwriters would be allowed to change this rule through an agreement with the firm that limits their share of liability, so long as this
change is mentioned in the prospectus (up to a certain legal minimum,
for example, the rate of commissions collected or any standard rate
between one and five percent). In Partnoy's opinion, the existing arrangement, which allows underwriters the due diligence defense, entails high costs due to the law's reliance on the underwriter reputation
mechanism. Therefore, in Partnoy's opinion, a different solution
should be found which does not rely on this mechanism. Author J.C.
Coffee 5 also suggested that the IPO gatekeeper should be subject to
strict liability, with a limitation on claim size. Coffee's suggestions,
however, are based on regulation rather than a contractual arrange6
ment, and in determining the damages ceiling in a different manner.
In many studies that discuss the aspects of underwriter liability, various justifications for the existing rules are suggested. Some studies
3. Gatekeepers in the securities primary market are entities who provide monitoring to the
supply of securities to investors. For other definitions, see Reinier H. Kraakman Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcment Strategy, 2 J. OF L. EcoN. & ORG. 53 (1986); Assaf
Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability. 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 58 (2003); John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform: The Challengeof FashioningRelevant Reform, 84 B.U .L. REV. 301, 308-311
(2004); and Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 735 (2004). As Coffee has pointed
out:
[T]wo core elements underlie the concept of gatekeeper, and it is important to distinguish between them. First, the gatekeeper is a person who has significant reputational
capital, acquired over many years and many clients, which it pledges to assure the accuracy of statements or representations that it either makes or verifies. Second, the gatekeeper receives a far smaller benefit or payoff for its role, as an agent, in approving,
certifying, or verifying information than does the principal from the transaction that the
gatekeeper facilitates or enables.
John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reform,
84 B.U .L. REV. 301, 308 (2004).
4. Frank Partnoy, Barbariansat the Gatekeepers?:A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 491, 546-47 (2001). For a more detailed discussion in his claims, see
infra Section III.
5. Coffee, supra note 3 at 306-307. For a more detailed discussion in his claims, see infra at
Section III.
6. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L
Rev. 365, 368-73 (2004) (explaining why, in his opinion, his suggestion for applying strict liability,
allowing contractual conditioning, is superior to Coffee's). For a more detailed discussion in his
claims, see infra at Section III.

454

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:451

have found disclosure of information through underwriter due diligence to be highly beneficial, for various reasons, usually without asking the material question of the present discussion: whether liability
should be strict or negligence-based. Other studies, however, suggest
7
doing away with underwriter liability under the present system.
This article argues that the director general of an underwriter consortium (leader), together with other underwriters, should be held liable for negligence (and also required to shoulder the burden of
proving that they have not been negligent in their due diligence), and
not strictly liable, for the presence of misleading details in the IPO
prospectus. The justifications for this approach are presented in two
models. In the first model, 8 capital markets suffer from the problem of
hidden actions by company managers and the leader, in turn creating
a moral hazard problem. The second model 9 focuses on the IPO pricing process and the way securities are distributed to investors using
the bookbuilding method.
Section II provides a background regarding the role of the Leader
of the Consortium of Underwriters. Section III presents studies discussing, either directly or indirectly, the level of liability that should be
imposed on a director general of an underwriter consortium and the
other underwriters for misleading details in the IPO prospectus. It will
focus on justifications for holding the leader liable based on a negligence standard, or for justifications for strict liability and on differences between their thesis and that presented herin. Furthermore, we
will refer to studies which suggested not holding underwriters liable.
Section IV details the justifications supporting a negligence rather
than strict liability rule. Section V reviews possible counterarguments
for the justifications supporting a negligence standard. Section VI examines the first insight derived from the thesis concerning the design
of various sections of the appropriate law by asking, what is the appropriate standard of care that should be imposed on other participants in
the issue's process. Finally, section VII summarizes the discussion and
inquires whether the thesis presented herein has further implications
in terms of designing other elements of the appropriate law in the area
of holding IPO participants liable for misleading details in the prospectus and in other areas beyond the scope of liability for misleading
7. For more on arguments presented in the legal literature discussing negligence versus strict
liability of IPO undewriters, see infra in Section III.
8. For a comprehensive presentation of the model, see Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for
IPO's: Deterrence in a Double Moral Hazard Model, supra note 2. See also infra Section IV-A1.
9. For a comprehensive presentation of the model, see Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for
IPO's: Deterrence in a see also infra Section IV-B1.
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details in IPO's for which using either the negligence or the strict liability standard is being considered.
II.

BACKGROUND

In the IPO market, underwriters are financial intermediates whose
main roles are to distribute the offered securities, give quasi-insurance
to the issue, and bridge information gaps between sellers and buyers
in the primary market.10 Usually, underwriters act in a group, or consortium, which assigns to its members their said commitment to distribute the securities, to insure the issue, and to bridge information
gaps."1 The crucial work of the consortium, which includes bridging
information gaps, is being done by the leader. Before the IPO, the
issuing firm usually contacts an underwriter who undertakes to manage the IPO. This underwriter, usually an investment bank or a big
investment company, is called a leader. As IPO manager, the leader's
duties include: (1) advising the issuer, (2) providing investment-banking services, including management and financial support for company
activities, (3) assistance in formulating the prospective, (4) carrying
out due diligence, (5) assessing the value of securities to be sold, (6)
determining the IPO's structure and terms, and (7) creating and managing the securities' underwriting and distribution networks. The
leader's crucial role in the IPO allows her to affect its structure and
terms, including the price of the securities offered and disclosure to
the public of information relevant to an investment decision.
Under prevailing American law, the underwriters 12 of a public offering of securities bear civil liability for damages suffered by inves10. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 613-621 (1984) (discussing the role of the investment banker). According to

the common IPO American system, the underwriters's role is to purchase securities from the
issuer in order to distribute them to the public. Id.
11. "Underwriting" is an insurance term. In insurance transactions, it means joining, by means
of signing an insurance policy, an insurance obligation by a consortium of insurers. See Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1287 (9th ed. 1990). In the case of securities underwriting, this consortium purchases the securities offered in order to sell them to the public (according to the
common IPO American system). Id.
12. Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77b(11), defines the term "underwriter" as follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a
commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall
include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
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tors resulting from misleading details in the offering prospectus. The
underwriters are subject to a negligence standard and bear the burden
of proof in showing that the misleading details in the prospectus did
not result from their negligence. 13 Moreover, potential defendants can
deny liability by arguing that, at the time of the transaction, the investor was aware of the untruth or ommission claimed to constitute the
14
misleading detail.

III.

A

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature on underwriter liability is based, methodically, on
management oversight and mandatory disclosure duties.15 Most retrolled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the
issuer.
Id. For a detalied examination of the definition's components, see Louis Loss & Joel Seligman,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 246-61(Aspen Publishers 3d ed., 1995); Louis Loss
& Joel Seligman 2 SECURITIES REGULATION 1108-1134 (Little Brown & Co. Law & Bus. 3d ed.,
1993); Louis. Loss & JoelSeligman SECURITIES REGULATION 193-95 (Little Brown & Co. Law &
Bus. 3d ed., 1998 Supp.); Thomas L. Hazen ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 244-256
(West 3d ed. 1996); and Jennifer O'Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the
Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. (1996) 217.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). Section 11(a) of the Securities Act holds the undersigned on
registration statements, the issuing firm, its directors, the experts undersigned on opinions attached to the prospectus and the underwriters themselves all liable under civil law. Id at
§ 77k(a)(1-5). According to § 11(a), they are liable "in case any part of the registration statement, when such part becomes effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading." Id. at § 77(k)(a) (hereinafter and above "misleading detail"). Any
buyer of securities in an IPO or in the secondary market may thus sue for damages due to such a
misleading detail. In § 11 suits, the plaintiff need not show reliance on the misleading detail and
the existence of a causal relation or an element of damage. In case the registration statement
contains a misleading detail, the underwriters will be exempt from § 11(a) liability only if they
can rely on one of the defenses outlined in § 11(b). 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(b) (2006). The most
important among those will apply if they show that they have carried out a reasonable investigation and had a reason to believe, and indeed believed, that no misleading detail was included in
the registration statement. Id. This means that the liability standard applied to the underwriters
is negligence, and that they carry the burden of proof to show that they have not been negligent.
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(codifed at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006)). See also Loss & Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION, SUPRA note 12, at Vol. IX, 4255.
15. In the literature on mandatory disclosure duties and their enforcement we can identify a
variety of approaches. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 276-314 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991). For example, Easterbrook and
Fischel believe, that in a world with anti-deception laws, the disclosure system should be based
on self-disclosure by the issuing companies. Id. Some argue that it is improper to implement a
mandatory disclosure regime. This approach is based on claims that market mechanisms would
operate optimally without legal intervention, or alternatively, on the various specific costs of
such an intervention. See also Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2368 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman,
The Dangerous Extraterritorialityof American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 207
(1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903(1998); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
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search follows Gilson and Kraakman's assertions that, in the IPO market, underwriters have three main functions: to distribute the offered
securities, give quasi-insurance to the issue, and to bridge information
gaps between sellers and buyers. 16 The discussion focuses mainly on
whether underwriters should be liable under civil law for the presence
of misleading details in the prospectus and not the degree of liability
that should be imposed. It also focuses on the underwriters' role of
bridging information gaps between sellers and buyers and not on
17
other roles. On the one hand, many writers (for example, Fox,
Kraakman 18 and Coffee 19) find great benefits in holding underwriters
legally liable for reasons such as the positive effect of underwriters, as
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 VA. L.
REV. 1335(1999); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1 (1999); Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:A Market-BasedProposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (1999); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance,and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 Texas L. Rev. 1657 (2002) ; Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation
of Government Authority: The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA L. REV. 1453 (1997). For arguments stressing self-disclosure as an exclusively efficient system, see Douglas W. Diamond, Optimal Release of Information by Firms, 40 J. OF FIN. 1071 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey ,
Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:A Case Study of the SEC at
Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud,67
N.Y.U.L. REV. 750 (1992). Others have found several justifications for such duties. There are
many reasons for mandatory disclosure duties. Even Easterbrook and Fischel, who've supported
the revocation of the mandatory disclosure rules regime, have found such reasons. In their view,
disclosure duties can resolve under-disclosure problems due to three potential causes: (1) Information provided by the firm also serves investors and other firms; (2) The impossibility of charging a price for the production of comparative information; and (3) The lack of incentive to create
the most inexpensive disclosure format. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 290-92, 300-302 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991). For arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure duties, see John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Joel Seligman,
The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. OF CORP. L 1 (1983);
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047 (1995); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002). For justificatons for imposing
mandatory disclosure duties in view of the ability of those held liable to insure the legal "accident" under discussion, see Joshua Ronen, Post Enron-Reform, Financial Statement Insurance,
and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 39 (2002) (concluding that a market based
solution realigning auditors' incentives is necessary in any securitires reform provision). For further conclusions based on Ronen's analysis, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413,
439-42(2004). For a discussion of the various approaches and cost-benefit considerations involved in a mandatory disclosure system, see also Merrit B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997).
16. Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 10 at 616-617.
17. Merritt B. Fox. Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due-Diligence:
An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1128-32 (1984).
18. Kraakman, supra note 3.
19. John C. Coffee. Re-Engineering CorporateDisclosure: The Coming Debate Over Company
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1168-69 (1995) .
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reputable intermediates, on the precise pricing of securities, on the
conduct of the managements of issuing firms and in preventing entry
of low-quality firms who present themselves as high-quality firms in
20
order to mislead investors.
On the other hand, some claim that it is inefficient to hold underwriters liable. For example, Choi 21 claims that it is ineffecient and
costly to the IPO market to intervene in the market and hold financial
intermediates liable. 22 According to his view, the benefit of barring
entry to misleading, low-quality firms might be overshadowed by the
costs, such as those involved in unnecessary defense required of all
market participants where the market already provides effective defense, for example, through the investors' ability to identify product
quality. 23 Choi, 24 therefore, suggests that financial intermediates not
be held liable in the traditional legal sense, but a system of self-tailored liability should be implemented, where underwriters are able to
select their applicable duties out of several alternatives, including the
effective period of their binding contractual commitments to the
25
investors.
Further arguments (for and against imposition of underwriters' liability) focus on underwriters' quasi-insurance role. On the one hand,
as Partnoy 26 stated: "A second Conception of the function of securities
regulation as applied to underwriters assumes that the underwriter
20. Kraakman, supra note 3, at 94. (noting that key affiliates, like underwritrs, serve as
"reputational intermediaries"). As mentioned above, we have presented elsewhere the reasons
we believe require holding the leader and the other IPO underwriters liable. See Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's: Deterrencein a Double Moral Hazard Model, supra note 2; Sher,
UnderwriterCivil Liabilityfor IPO's: An Economic Analysis, supra note 2. For the necessity of
gatekeeper liability, see also John C. Coffee, The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting (Working Paper No. 191
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=270944 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006); Coffee, supra note
3.
21. Stephen J. Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 916 (1998).
22. Id.at 962-965.
23. Id. at 947.
24. Id. at 949-966.
25. Id. For more research that points to the need of reducing legal intervention in the area of
IPO and gatekeepers' liability, see Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV.747 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More
Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 753 (1997);
Donald C. Langevoort, DeconstructingSection 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (2000); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on
Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulating of FinancialInstitutions, 66 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1019 (1993); Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligationsof FinancialHolding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1994); Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is ThirdParty Liability Necessary?, 17 J.LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988).
26. Partnoy, supra note 4, at 517.
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can serve a risk-bearing function". Partnoy accepted Dooley's 27 observation that underwriters do not provide insurance, but believes that it
"does not mean that they could not in the future" (assuming a proper
liability regime). On the other hand, Banoff 28 claims that when issuing
securities in an efficient market, the cost of due diligence that is required under an underwriter liability regime, outweighs its benefits. In
her opinion, holding underwriters liable provides additional insurance
to investors without increasing their welfare, apart perhaps from cases
when new securities are issued. 29 The reason for this is that investors
diversify their portfolios, thus reducing the specific risk involved in
holding securities, including the specific risk that underwriters should
neglect to find misleading details in the prospectus. This argument has
also been advanced by Romano 30 in the context of IPO's.
As mentioned above, Partnoy suggested 31 that the underwriter liability regime would be strict liability with an option for change. The
rule would be that underwriters will be held liable for any damage
that a legal decision or settlement would determine that the issuing
company should compensate investors for. The underwriters will have
the option of changing the rule by agreeing with the company on limiting the percentages of their involvement in its liability. This will be
subject to the proviso that such a change be stated in the prospectus
(up to a certain legal minimum, for example, the rate of commissions
collected or any standard rate between one and five percent).
As for the underwriters' role of bridging information gaps between
sellers and buyers, Partnoy 32 claimed, that the costs of lawsuits against
underwriters are forbiddingly high (also ex ante), and that, in many
cases, the underwriters fail the examination. Partnoy pointed to the
fact that underwriters, acting as gatekeepers, may prefer to jeopardize
their reputation in order to secure higher short-term profits. 33 Furthermore, beside high litigation costs with poor benefits, the existing
legal solution, offering underwriters the defense of due diligence, entails high costs as a result of legal uncertainty, and other costs resulting from the fact that the law grants underwriters excessive property
27. Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issue
Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 788 (1972).
28. Barbara A. Banoff , Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:An
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 183 (1984).
29. Id.
30. Romano, supra note 15.
31. Partnoy, supra note 4, at 491-493, 540-546.
32. Id. at 513.
33. Id.at 497. "On one hand, gatekeepers may achieve short-term gains by providing inaccurate certification or by overstating the value of securities." Id
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rights, due to the centralization it imposes on underwriters. Partnoy
claimed, 34 that "[t]he more vigorously the securities laws are enforced
in court, particularly against lower quality gatekeepers, the higher the
barrier to entry in those areas". Therefore, Partnoy reasons that a different solution should be found, one not relying on underwriter
reputation.
In Partnoy's opinion, regulation holding underwriters liable can also
have indirect effects. 35 Among the two most important are: (1) the
high costs entailed in holding underwriters liable may deter them from
preferring to raise capital in private issues; and (2) holding underwriters liable can be seen as an indirect bestowal of superfluous property
rights, in areas only indirectly relevant to the public offering. In Smith
v. Van Gorkom36 , for example, the court decided that the directors
could have served their duties for the firm had they contacted an investment bank for its opinion on the appropriateness of the transaction in question. 37 Since firm managers are usually risk averse, it is
reasonable to believe that they tend to over-invest in the opinion's
quality. The same holds for the underwriters' quality. Hence, the underwriting market becomes a "winner takes all" market, in which the
big investment banks are able to ask for and receive higher commissions than in a non-regulated market.
According to Partnoy, a regime of strict gatekeeper liability with an
option to change offers several advantages: 38 First, it reduces the costs
of negotiations between the issuing firm and its underwriters. 3 9 Second, it permits dividing the benefits of such cost reduction between
the underwriters and the investors.4 0 Third, it promotes a more decentralized market "by encouraging competition based on the willingness
of the gatekeeper to assume the expected liability of the issuer and by
reducing direct and indirect regulatory costs and regulatory licenses,
which tend to benefit only top-tier firms and to encourage market

concentration. "41
As for the underwriters' quasi-insurance role, Partnoy4 2 believes a
strict liability regime applied according to his suggestion offers an ad34. Id. at 520.
35. Id. at 505.
36. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The example is in Partnoy, supra
note 4, at 523.
37. See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 522.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 542-544.
40. Id. at 542.
41. See Partnoy supra note 4, at 542.
42. Id. at 542-545.
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ditional advantage: risks will still be distributed as they are today major underwriters signing indemnity contracts with firms and effecting insurance arranagements. However, the suggested regime will allow them to do so in a less costly insurance environment, since there
will be no need to distinguish, for the purpose of establishing liability,
between intentional acts of commission or omission, those attributable
to negligence and others. Essentially, Partnoy suggests shifting the focus of the gatekeepers' role to more of an insurance role and less of a
43
policing role.
In an analysis of the reasons for gatekeepers' failure to oversee
company reports (focusing mainly on accountants, analysts - who are
usually employed by investment banks - and lawyers, for whom he
believes there's a need for a special arranement), Coffee 44 suggested
that the central arrangement in the area of gatekeeper liability be
strict liability combined with a limitation on the amount claimed. The
limitation should be determined as follows: "Under this approach, for
example, if the corporate client were found liable for $100 million,
then the auditor would have to contribute toward that liability up to
the amount of its policy. The one mandatory element in this proposal
would be a minimum floor on the gatekeeper's insurance policy that
would have to equal some adequate multiple of the highest annual
revenues received by the gatekeeper from its client over the last several years. For purposes only of illustration, let us assume a multiplier
of ten. Now, on the facts of the Enron case, where it has been widely
reported that Arthur Andersen received roughly $52 million from Enron in its final year, Andersen's liability would be not less than $520
million (i.e., $ 52 million times ten)".
In Coffee's opinion, the advantages of strict liability over negligence
45
liability are:
(1) strict liability gives the gatekeeper greater incentive to take precautions and exercise due diligence; (2) strict liability induces the
gatekeeper to limit its level of activity, for example, by rejecting
overly risky corporations as clients; and (3) strict liability spares
both courts and regulators the need to descend into the Serbonian
bog of defining precise standards of care, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing predictability.
43. See Partnoy supra note 4, at 542.
44. Coffee, supra note 3, at 353-363. In Coffee's opinion, the legal regime should be made
compatible with each type of gatekeeper. Id. He believes lawyers should be subjected to special
rules. Id.
45. Id. at 346-347. Coffee suggests that these advantages, discussed in economic analysis of the
law literature are agreed upon by both those who support a strict liability role and those who
oppose it. Id, See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 514 (supporting liability); see Hamdani, supra note 3,
at 59 (opposing liability).
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He suggests that a negligence rule does not meet the need for deterring gatekeepers and entails high judicial costs. A strict liability rule,
although meeting the need for deterrence, is not without its own
shortcomings: 46 First, in the new market equilibrium, gatekeepers will
demand fees so as to reflect the risk they may have to shoulder in the
case of a "fraudulent" firm. Given the higher fees they can be expected to demand, and assuming gatekeepers would not be able to
distinguish, completely and in advance, between "fraudulent" and
"honest" customers, the resultant high fees can push even "honest"
customers out of the market. Second, a strict liability regime might
push "quality" gatekeepers out of the market, to be replaced by
"lower quality" gatekeepers who wouldn't be able to prevent "fraudulent" issuing firms from entering the IPO market. Finally, a strict liability regime might increase the number of claims. In Coffee's
opinion, 47 his suggested regime will meet the need for deterring gatekeepers, on the one hand, without imposing forbiddingly high costs on
the market or compromising the stability of market players, on the
other.
Coffee 4 8 suggests that his view differs from Partnoy's on several
grounds. 49 First, Coffee's suggested rule "is essentially regulatory"
while Partnoy's "is essentially contractual." 50 The gatekeeper market
is highly centralistic, so that gatekeepers will tend not to undertake
any commitment which exceeds minimal requirement. Moreover, in a
bubble period, should Partnoy's rule be adopted, investors may desist
in view of the fact that the leaders have accepted only part of the
liability, even though it is reflected in the IPO prospectus. In addition,
potential clients do not have strong incentives to bargain for a high
level of liability. Second, Partnoy "uses a precentage of the total damages as his minimum floor," while Coffee "uses a multiple of the gatekeeper's highest annual revenues from the client. 5 1a Finally, as
opposed to Partnoy's rule, he believes his suggestion will lead to gatekeeper bankruptcy only in extremely rare cases. Although Coffee
thinks the two suggestions do not stem from a tort standpoint - that of
internalizing damages - which is inapplicable, but from the need to
ensure optimal deterrence. The difference between the two consists in
his regime's ability to achieve optimal deterrence (the sanction expec46. Coffee, supra note 3, at 347-349.
47. Id. at 349-350.
48. Id. at 350-353.
49. Id. at 350-353.
50. Id. at 350.
51. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 350 (outlining the differences between Coffee's approach and
Partnoy's approach).
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tancy being higher than the profit expectancy), while Partnoy's will
not be able to achieve such equilibrium (the parameters for determining the compensation rate can lead to compensation that is too high).
Partnoy's counterarguments are as follows: 52 First, in reference to
Coffee's 53 claims that his own system is advantageous in being based
on regulation, 54 unlike Partnoy's mainly contractual system. First, he
believes that the contractual stipulation option will add another parameter to the market game (determining liability level) which will
increase competition.5 5 Moreover, even in a bubble period, he expects
investors not to ignore information about the scope of liability accepted by leaders. Finally, in response to the argument that prospectives do not have strong incentives to bargain for a high level of
liability, he believes the requirement of specifying the gatekeeper liability ratio in the proepectus will lead to choosing an optimal liability
56
level.
Second, in reference to Coffee's 57 claims (even though his system is
preferable as it is based on a damages ceiling which is a multiple of the
high annual revenue) and as opposed to Partnoy's ceiling, which is
based on a precentage of the damages: (1) "[D]amages based on revenues would measure only private costs to gatekeepers, not social costs,
and therefore would either under-deter or over-deter, depending on
the relationship between gatekeeper revenues and overall shareholder
damages; ' 58 (2) "Calculating a revenues multiple is fraught with technical difficulties; ' 59 (3) "Professor Coffee's assertions as to the scope
of gatekeeper liability under a percentage measure are not supported
by available facts". 60 According to Partnoy, his own suggestion will
not lead to frequent gatekeeper bankruptcies since the average settlement in class-action security-related suits in 2000-2002, in the United
States, ranged between 15 and 25 million dollars (excluding one large
settlement of $3.19 billion in 2000); and (4) "Having a regulator dictate a minimum liability cap would exacerbate the adverse selection
52. Partnoy, supra note 6.
53. Id. at 368-370.
54. Id. at 368-370.
55. Id. at 369.
56. Id. "Moreover, because the minimum percentage would be disclosed in public documents,
it would more likely be the subject of competition than other variables (such as hourly rates,
number of professionals assigned, or scope of the project) that are not disclosed." Id.
57. Id. at 370-374.
58. See Partnoy, supra note 6, at 370.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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problem gatekeepers face by preventing them from engaging in price
discrimination as to liability. '61
Hamdani 62 presented the considerations to be taken into account
when determining the gatekeepers' scope of liability. He argued 63
that, in principle, as suggested by the economic analysis of the law
literature, 64 and not unlike Coffee's position, 65 strict liability: (1) provides wrongdoers with optimal incentives to exercise precaution (as in
negligence schemes); (2) makes defendants adopt optimal activity
levels; and (3) relieves courts from entering the thicket of determining
what constitutes "reasonable care" in a given set of circumstances. 66
However, the second insight does not extend to gatekeeper liability.
As Coffee claimed, strict liability will increase gatekeeper fees. 67 In a
market where gatekeepers cannot distinguish among prospective clients based on wrongful intentions and therefore cannot charge each
one of them according to its risk - this will result in three plausible
outcomes: Gatekeeper liability may drive out only law-abiding clients
and leave intact the number of wrongdoers. 68 Alternatively, it may
lead to the unraveling of the relevant market. Finally, it may have no
impact on the number and quality of clients entering the market. 69
In Hamdani's 70 opinion, adopting a strict liability rule can offer certain benefits also in terms of improved deterrence of misconduct by
issuing companies. However, he states, "Whether the benefits of strict
liability outweigh its costs is an empirical matter. Other things being
equal, however, moving in the direction of strict liability will become
more appealing when (1) the government does a poor job in implementing a negligence-based regime, and (2) gatekeepers become more
effective in preventing client wrongdoing". 71
The idea that imposing strict reliability on gatekeepers might be undesirble has also been suggested by Kraakman.72 He claimed that
holding underwriters strictly liable may result in their being punished
"for a much wider range of misconduct than they can actually detect."
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 373.
Hamdani, supra note 3.
Id. at 59, 63-82.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and the accompanying text (discussing Coffee's approach).
Hamdani, supra note 3, at 84-85.
See Coffee, supra note 3, at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Hamdani, supra note 3, at 61, 82-98.
Id. at 103.
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 76.
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The dispute over the question of underwriter liability has to do, on
the one hand, with a description of the way markets behave and the
definition of underwriter responsibilities. On the other hand, it also
touches on determining the proper function of the law. Coffee and
Partnoy's approach is based on an interpretation of the cost structure
that identifies primary market failures as caused by, among other
things, the fact that the leader's reputation is insufficient to solve the
adverse selection problem. These failures justify, in their view, holding
gatekeepers liable.
The present thesis differs from their approach not only in its
description of how the IPO market operates but also in terms of the
roles the law plays, or could play, in the existing market structure. In
our opinion, a negligence-based liability arrangement can better serve
the existing primary market issuing mechanism and reduce its existing
costs better than a strict liability arrangement.
The justifications presented here for a negligence standard also argue against relieving underwriters of any liability for misleading details in the offering prospectus. Thus, Choi 73 described the primary
market as a market with both high and low quality companies, financial intermediates, and uninformed investors. 74 At the first stage, the
investment state, the companies select whether to be high-, or lowquality. 75 At the second stage, the IPO stage, the market comprises a
constant amount of firms of both kinds, and they present themselves
as high- or low-quality in order to sell their stock. 76 Since investors
cannot distinguish between high- and low-quality firms, a market
equilibrium is reached where, at the second stage, all firms present
themselves as high-quality and the investors respond by devaluating
the securities, while at the first stage, the firms prefer to be low-quality. In this market, financial intermediates have the important role of
verifying the company's quality. The higher the verification quality,
the greater the companies' incentive to invest in higher quality. On
the other hand, a higher verification standard involves greater expense (higher commissions).
Choi claimed that intervening in the market by holding the financial
77
intermediates liable can be inefficient and costly for the IPO market.
In his view, the benefit of barring entry to misleading, low-quality
73. Choi, supra note 21. For more research that had pointed to the need of reducing legal
intervention in the area of IPO's and gatekeepers' liability, see supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
74. Choi, supra note 21.
75. Id. at 922.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 946-949.
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firms might be overshadowed by the costs, such as those involved in
unnecessary defense required of all market participants where the
market already provides effective defense, for example, through the
investors' ability to identify product quality.7 8 The government can
also intervene in determining the verification's level of precision and
the intermediates' verification costs, limitations that might be inefficient and weaken the investigation incentives or cause some of the
intermediates to exit the market, respectively. 79 Government intervention can also hamper the dynamic development of market mechanism, which may deal effectively with deception.8 0 Furthermore, it
may lead to a wave of unjustified claims intended to blackmail the
financial intermediates, which may cause some of them to exit the
market and reduce competition. 81 Choi8 2 therefore suggested not to
hold the financial intermediates liable in the traditional legal sense,
and instead implement a system of self-tailored liability, where underwriters will be able to select their applicable duties out of several alternatives, including the effective period of their binding contractual
83
commitments to the investors.
The present thesis counters such arguments by showing that a negligence standard can offer a good solution for the costs entailed in the
current market mechanism, without interventions seeking to change
market structure. Among other things, it emphasizes the role of the
leader's reputation in the primary-market issuing mechanisms, and
her ability to behave strategically in this market.
The importance of leader reputation in the issuing mechanism is
clear and supported by empirical findings. These findings point to the
relation between the main leader's reputation and the approach
adopted by players in the market to the results of IPO's. Among
others, Nanda and Yumfound 84 that up to a certain rate, substantial
underpricing of IPO's is followed by a significant increase in the
leader's market value. A similar effect was not found concerning the
market value of run-of-the-mill underwriters or of other consortium
executives. It was also found that underpricing that is higher than a
certain rate is followed by a smaller increase in the leader's market
78. Id.
79. See Choi, supra note 21, at 947.
80. Id. at 948.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 949-966.
83. Id.
84. V. Nanda & Y. Yun, Reputation and FinancialIntermediation:An EmpiricalInvestigation
of the Impact of IPO Mispricing on Underwriter Market Value, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 39
(1997).
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value. A loss in the leader's market value was found in a case where

offerings where overpriced.
An important study on the evaluation of securities issued by investment banks was recently conducted by Deloof, De Maeseneire and
Inghelbrecht.8 5 Based on data from the Brussels Stock Exchange

(BXS) for the years 1939-2000, these researchers found that evaluations of IPO's by the underwriting consortium managers are based, in
each issue, on a variety of value assessment methods. Some of those

are precise (such as the method based on the predicted net cash flow)
while others are systematically biased. This finding suggests that leaders deliberately bias the offering price, or at least, that underpricing
takes place despite the fact that the leader knows the expected postIPO market price. These results support the approach which stresses
the leader's strategic behavior in each stage of the issuing process.

IV.

THE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT: NEGLIGENCE OR

SRicr LIABILITY?

A.

The Question of Directing Behavior: Efficiency Aspects in a
Double Moral Hazard Model
1. A Double Moral Hazard Model

The first model 8 6 to be presented considers the fact that the existing
capital market structure creates a problem of hidden actions by both
the firm executives and the leader, which leads to a moral hazard
problem. As such, it differs from standard models presenting the capital markets partial information problem as an adverse selection
87
problem.
85. Marc Deloof, Wouter De Maeseneire & Koen Inghelbrecht, The Valuation of IPO's by
Investment Banks and the Stock Market: EmpiricalEvidence, (Working Paper 2002) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=298602 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
86. See Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's: Deterrence in a Double Moral Hazard
Model, supra note 2, for a comprehensive discussion of the model, See also Sher, Underwriter
Civil Liability for IPO's: An Economic Analysis, supra note 2.
87. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577 (Princeton Univ. Press
1990). Kreps clarifies the distinction between the problems, as follows: Moral hazard - "...,
where one party to a transaction may undertake a certain action that (a) affects the other party's
valuation of a transaction but where (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly." Id.
Adverse selection - "..., where one party to a transaction knows things pertaining to the transaction that are relevant but unknown to the second party." Id. For more discussion on the differences between the problems, see Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's: Deterrence in a
Double Moral Hazard Modelsupra note 2. See also Sher, UnderwriterCivil Liability for IPO's:
An Economic Analysis, supra note 2. Note that in many situations, there are mixed problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard. In those papers we argued that the existing primary-market
problem can also be presented as a moral hazard problem, and not only as an adverse selection
problem.
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According to this model, the central players in the market act strategically: the issuing companies can chose how to portray themselves;
leaders can chose the effort they exert in carrying out due diligence
requirements; and investors can chose the degree of trust they have in
the presentations of each issuing company and leader and tailor their
demands for the securities offered to the appropriate level of trust.
The model does not involve firms of varying quality, but various
levels of misleading descriptions of offered securities. The investors,
who estimate that each firm might report inadequate information at a
certain distribution of deception levels, weigh this information into
the price that ought to be paid, in their opinion, for the offered securities. The main problem in the primary market is that the firm cannot
convince the investors of having provided adequate disclosure (without substantial transaction costs). Consequently, the equilibrium
stock-market price will be lower than the price resulting from a situation in which all parties have complete information (or where the firm
can convince the investors of having provided adequate disclosure
without substantial transaction costs).
The problem described here is that of hidden action by company
executives, resulting in a moral hazard problem. The company hires a
leader to market, distribute and insure the IPO, and to bridge the information gaps conducive to the moral hazard problem, which does
not allow it to raise capital at an optimal price. The leader is in a
situation where hiring her distribution and risk-reduction services also
includes hiring her reputation for reducing information asymetric's
costs. This is because she cannot separate reputation from the other
services provided. The investors know that the leader collects and
analyzes all information required for the transaction, with a view to
maximize the utility from collecting the information and assessing it
minus the collection and assessments costs. The investors realize that
this means the leader carries out a comprehensive check of information relevant to evaluating the transaction. Information about the securities' value and the risk they represent is important to the leader in
order to estimate the deal and determine its various terms. Should a
leader make a mistake, for instance, overestimate the securities' value,
she might find herself in a situation where the stock offered does not
sell and the underwriters are stuck with overpriced securities. In this
For a presentation of the capital market partial information problem as an incentive collapse
problem, see, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15 (discussing the general area of imposing
mandatory disclosure); Choi, supra note 21 (noting justifications for underwriter liability);
Partnoy, supra note 4; Hamdani, supra note 3, Coffee, supra note 3; Partnoy, supra note 6 (discussing negligence versus strict liability).

20061

NEGLIGENCE VERSUS STRICr LIABILITY

469

case, when it is realized that the share price is falling (following information processing by the secondary market), the leader's reputation
inevitably suffers. Even in a case where investors realize that the prospectus contains a misleading detail and the share price is dropping,
loss of reputation naturally ensues.
Underwriters know that their ability to transact with companies in
the future depends on their past successes. Their reputation is highly
sensitive to failure in selling issued stock and to mistakes in collecting
and assessing information. In addition to closing the deal (profitably),
the underwriters wish mainly to create a good reputation, as good as
possible. In the model, underwriters select the price of securities offered to the public. Their selection is based on data provided by the
firm and double-checked by them, data later conveyed to investors
through the draft prospectus; the investors' response in evaluating the
real price of the offered securities is then the final basis for the
leader's estimate of the expected real price.
In the model, two fundamental questions arouse: (1) Why hiring the
leader's reputation services is not enough to solve the asymmetric information problem; and (2) How a law holding the leader liable solves
this problem.
The answer to the first question is that without a law holding leaders liable, investors cannot know how much effort the leader has exerted in implementing due diligence. They cannot review the raw data
provided by the firm to the leader, have no record of the leader's activities and are in know place to judge, based on the securities' performance alone, whether any drop in share value is due to natural
causes (a business failure by the firm) or to inadequate disclosure.
Since investors do not know the causes of share-price changes, they
have no reason to believe a leader's reputation will change in proportion to the effort exerted. Since reputation's evolution as dependent
on the conduct of the various participants to a given IPO is not
known, the investors cannot be convinced that it would always be
profitable for the leader to exert an optimal effort. The leader's effort
in carrying out due diligence is also hidden and therefore, this creates
a leader moral hazard problem, resulting in several potential market
equilibria.
The answer to the second question is that a law requiring optimal
leader effort may facilitate a new, more efficient equilibrium by creating a convention regarding the leader's chosen strategy. Having no
incentive to mislead the investors, the leader prefers the optimal-effort equilibrium and the investors believe her. The problem is that the
leader cannot convince the investors that among all possible equilib-
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ria, that in which she exerts an optimal effort and they believe her will
actually obtain. However, a social convention regarding the leader's
strategy may contribute substantially to preferring a game play leading to the desired equilibrium and for recognizing such a desired equilibrium should it, in fact, obtain.
The role played by the law in resolving the hidden action problem is
that it provides a credible threat of revealing a leader's actions to the
investors. When the share price drops and the investors suspect their
leader of not having exerted an optimal effort, they may turn to the
courts where the leader's actual behavior can be reviewed. Such a judicial review will begin already in the early procedural stages of the
legal process; through various disclosure requirements, such as document disclosure, the latter's modus operandi can be exposed. Additional tools that can increase the investors' certainty in their
assessment of the leader's true actions are the litigation process and
the legal decisions in later stages of the legal procedure.
An additional conclusion from the model is, inter alia, that when the
leader is held legally liable, it is much easier and cheaper to convince
company executives to opt for the proper disclosure strategy. The reason for that is that the law causes the leader to opt for a strategy of
exerting optimal effort in due diligence. Therefore, it becomes unprofitable for the executives to opt for a different strategy.
2.

Why a Negligence Rule Contributes to Optimal Equilibrium in
the IPO Market, While a Strict Liability Rule Might
Threaten It

As previously mentioned, from the efficiency maximization perspective, the leader is hired, among other things, in order to "compromise" her own reputation. It allows investors to trust that she will
exert optimal effort in order to prevent the inclusion of misleading
details in the IPO prospectus. The law supports this mechanism by
threatening to expose the leader's modus operandi in court. According to the consensus in the area of economic analysis of torts, the two
liability regimes under discussion, negligence and strict liability, will
cause a potential offender to take optimal precautions. However, in
the present case, a negligence rule supports the mechanism described,
while a strict liability rule does not, even to the point of undermining
it.
First, when it is feared that a misleading detail has been included in
the prospectus, investors cannot know this for certain. On the other
hand, we may assume that investors can estimate the probability that
the detail is misleading. Given some level of certainty that the detail is
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misleading, both factually and legally, investors estimate that it's possible the leader has not exerted an optimal effort in preventing its
inclusion in the prospectus. However, there is also the possibility that
she has, albeit unsuccessfully. When the applicable rule is strict liability, the uncertainty inherent in this situation will be only partially removed by a lawsuit, since the court will enquire whether a misleading
detail has been included in the prospectus, but not whether the
leader's due diligence effort has been optimal. Under a strict liability
regime, the threat to the leader's reputation has to do with the court's
ability to remove the uncertainty only from the facts and legal decisions related to the question of the actual presence of a misleading
detail. It has nothing to do with the level of effort actually exerted in
due diligence. Therefore, investors will not be able to rely, ex ante, on
the leader's presentation that he has harnessed her reputation to the
task. The leader will not be able to convince investors that their having hired her reputation means that he risks her reputation for conducting optimal due diligence. This is because, given a strict liability
rule, it will not be reviewed ex post.
On the other hand, a negligence rule will make the court deal with
the other concern, missing in the case of strict liability. Under a negligence regime, the court will also inquire whether the leader has in fact
acted optimally, exposing both her usual modus operandiand her conduct in the relevant case. In that, it will convey invaluable information
to the market allotment mechanism, allowing the market to rely ex
ante on the leader's presentation of having harnessed her reputation
to the task.
Second, when the applicable rule is strict liability, the leader has no
incentive for disclosing misleading details chances are will not be revealed, or being interpreted as indicating unprofessional conduct on
her part. In addition, there could be situations in which certain events
may be interpreted by the investors as highly likely to stem from lack
of professionalism by the leader, even if she had carried out optimal
due diligence. In these cases, too, the leader has no incentive to exert
optimal effort to prevent the inclusion of misleading details in the IPO
prospectus. A negligence rule solves that problem.
Third, a strict liability rule does not offer good support for the law's
function of reducing costs resulting from the effect of the due diligence procedure on third parties. Easterbrook and Fischel,8 8 who support revoking the mandatory disclosure rules regime, believe, among
other things, that had the investors been able to contract with all the
88. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 290 - 292, 300 - 302.
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firms at a negligible cost, they would have demanded that the firms
maintain a standard reporting format, allowing them to minimize the
costs of learning the "prospectus lingo" and to conduct optimal comparison between the firms. Their argument is that a possible justification for a mandatory disclosure rules is the law's inability to impose a
standard format; this is required since the firms themselves do not
have any harmonization incentives, and sometimes even have harmonization disincentives. 89 In this context, our argument is that holding
the leader liable for negligence will serve this purpose of ensuring a
standard reporting format better than a strict liability regime.
Standardization arguments also figure in Rock's 90 study, suggesting
that the U.S. mandatory disclosure laws are preferable to contractual
solutions in dealing with the issuing company's various problems, in
terms of the disclosure's content, credibility and enforceability. 91 In
his view, these laws act as an efficient mechanism on several levels:
First, through standardization. 92 Second, by allowing for compatible
disclosure requirements over time. 93 Third, by constituting a reliable
and professional enforcement mechanism promoting complete and accurate disclosure. 94 And finally, Rock suggests that it is easy for a private firm to go public and enter the capital market, but not as easy to
reacquire the securities traded in the market so as to exit (go private). 95 In his opinion, these facts suggest another important function
of the U.S. mandatory disclosure laws - making it possible for issuing
companies to reliably guarantee their disclosure level and their degree
of consistency in providing complete and accurate disclosure over
time. 96 Rock believes that such a commitment is reliable in view of the
heavy sanctions attached, the fact that it can be adjusted to SEC requirements (the SEC changes those in response to changes in the market), and the ability to enforce the law against issuers trying to avoid
the strict requirements for exiting the capital market (tender offers
rules, and so on).
The present thesis is consistent with Rock's argument, suggesting
that the U.S. mandatory disclosure laws provide a reliable and professional enforcement mechanism promoting complete and accurate dis89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Rock, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Rock, supra 15, at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
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closure. 97 However, according to the present thesis, imposing
mandatory, as opposed to contractual, liability on underwriters is not
enough; a negligence standard must be determined in order to ensure
a more effective market mechanism (in terms of efficiency and division of welfare). Descriptions of the primary market cost structure
and its operation, on the one hand, and of the law's function, on the
other, suggest that the market mechanism's high costs will be minimized under a negligence-based regime.
Fourth, creating a standard process of due diligence is also important. Holding the leader liable for negligence will serve this purpose
better than strict liability. The argument first focuses on the fact that
the leader plays an almost exclusive role in creating a standard test
format: she is the individual carrying them out in practice; she is
knowledgeable and experienced in the area; she has access to various
experts required for creating an efficient format; she is a repeated
player in the primary market and will be required to run the tests on
many other issues; compared to all other private, repeated players in
the primary market (such as accountants), only her own expertise covers all the areas relevant to creating that format; and, last but not
least, she has partially independent incentives for creating the standard format and enforcing it on the issuing firms. The law holds the
leader liable and thus enables her to make the most of those
advantages.
The law must step in and require the leader to create the standard
format because the leader also faces certain disincentives. First, a freerider problem is created when the major leaders consider whether to
make the required investments in creating an optimal due diligence
format. Each would prefer another leader to make the adjustments
required by market or legal changes, since she's bound to learn about
it eventually and be able to judge for herself whether such adjustments are worthwhile. Such learning is possible when several leaders
co-manage a consortium or from reports provided by leaders to ordinary underwriters about each offering (the so-called "comfort
letters").
A second problem involves the hidden nature of the leader's actions, which creates a moral hazard problem. The leader has no way to
prove to the market that she has the optimal due diligence format.
Even a very detailed report published alongside the prospectus would
not have enabled the market to scrutinize her actions. Moreover, such
97. As Rock stated, "Here, the public and private enforcement machinery of the securities
laws and the combination of criminal and civil liability makes securities disclosure far more credible than purely contractual representations." Id. at 686.
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a report would have exposed her to competition and also to various
claims by her clients, both legal and commercial. Clearly, the issuing
companies would have opposed any publication with a potential to
reveal commercial secrets or provide their competitors with important
advantages - even assuming, which cannot at all be taken for granted,
that such a disclosure would have contributed to exposing the leader's
modus operandi and the level of effort she exerted in that specific
offering.
A third problem is how to ensure standardization in a liability-free
regime. Holding the leader liable prevents the development of several
competing due diligence formats. The existence of several such formats will impair investors' abilities to compare the issuing companies
based on date published during the offering.
Finally, the issuing companies may pressure the leader to create a
due diligence format made to measure. They may refuse to accept special tests required by the leader without any external dictation. For
example, issuing firms will oppose the appointment of an external taxlaw expert or of a professional real-estate assessor.
The argument next details the manner in which a negligence rule
better serves the cause of creating a uniform, optimal format of due
diligence. The main reason for that is that such a rule will require the
court to inquire what the optimal format is and whether it has been
implemented in the case under litigation. Thus, through judicial oversight, and in fact, through the ex ante threat of oversight, a negligence
rule will contribute to solving the problems described herein. First, a
negligence rule will force each leader to develop an optimal format
independently. A strict liability rule will not have the same effect since
it allows the leader to decide that developing the efficient format independently is not economically worthwhile. Second, a negligence rule
deals with the fact that developing an optimal format is a hidden action, creating a moral hazard problem, by threatening a judicial inquiry as to the leader's due diligence format and its compatibility with
existing market conditions. Third, the same holds for the fear that several due diligence formats may be created, and the fear that the companies may pressure the leader to create a format made to their
measure. Fourth, a negligence rule will require the court to discuss the
issue, without allowing the leader to escape the fact that her own format is completely different from primary market current practice. A
negligence rule will not allow the leader to create a format that is not
the optimal one. Conversely, a strict liability rule does not allow the
court to discuss this question and therefore poses no threat enforcing
such a standard format on the leader and the issuing firms.
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Fifth, in the same context, a strict liability rule does not support the
law's ability to provide a mechanism allowing the adjustment of due
diligence over time. As mentioned above, one of the justifications for
imposing mandatory disclosure is the fact that it provides a mechanism permitting such adjustment. 98 In an analogy to this argument, it
is also important to adjust the due diligence format over time. A negligence rule permits the court to examine whether such an adjustment is
indeed taking place. One of the applicable legal requirements, when a
court examines whether a professional meets the required precaution
standard, is that professional's consideration of changing market conditions and diligence in staying updated about professional innovations (such as changes in the rules of accounting presentations,
changes in tax tools, or changes in the risk levels in a certain market).
A strict liability rule, on the other hand, does not allow the court to
look into this issue and therefore creates no external threat to the
leader in this area.
Sixth, enabling courts to determine criteria for optimal leader action will have a positive external effect on the market of private capital raisings. In this market, the normal operational model is
contractual, and leaders who act as intermediaries in such transactions
apply their methods and ways of presenting information to investors
in the IPO's market also to private capital raising agreements. Therefore, creating an optimal action structure in a regulated market will
have a positive external effect on a market in which significant regulations seems, on the face of it, inefficient. A negligence rule will allow
the application of a standard due diligence format, at very low costs,
to the contractual market as well, and allow the latter to operate using
an optimal testing format developing in a regulated market and optimally changing over time.
Seventh, a negligence rule has a certain advantage over a strict liability rule in that it encourages leaders to act with a certain degree of
transparency regarding the way they have conducted their due diligence. A negligence rule requires leaders to observe the market, in
order to make sure they are acting in a way acceptable to other leaders. Since actual coordination is illegal, the least costly way of "coordinating" leaders is providing market players with information about
the way due diligence is conducted (in the road show process, 99 and
98. See supra note 91 and the accompanying text.
99. "Road show" is the name given to the marketing campaign conducted after the submission of the first draft prospectus to the SEC. In a road show, representatives of the consortium
director general, together with senior managers in the offering firm, present the firm to prospective investors and analysts, and receive informal bids for securities offered in the IPO. This
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during the establishment of the underwriter consortium). Nevertheless, in both cases, the consortium's establishment requires financial
bodies joining in, whether as additional leaders or as ordinary underwriters, to receive copies of the comfort letters from the firm, its directors and the various IPO consultants, with a (partial) description of
the due diligence procedure - copies that are to be provided by the
leader, after having carried out the due diligence.
In summary, a negliglence rule creates an equilibrium wherein both
parties know, ex ante, that the court will try to expose the leader's
modus operandi. In doing so, the court will inquire whether the leader
operates according to an optimal due diligence format - one that is
adjusted to changing market conditions - and whether the leader has
indeed implemented that format in that specific offering. Moreover,
the court will provide information pertinent to these issues to both
parties, and to the capital market as well. This oversight and coordination mechanism requires the leader, and in fact even makes it possible
for her, to invest in developing and implementing the optimal format.
Furthermore, the leader is required to introduce appropriate changes
in her format, in accordance with her interpretation of changing market conditions and by reviewing comfort letters distributed by other
leaders, learning from procedures undertaken in collaboration with
other leaders and learning from court decisions. A strict liability regime, on the other hand, cannot function as such a mechanism and
does not provide the market with valuable information regarding the
appropriate due diligence format.
B.

The Question of Directing Behavior: Efficiency Aspects in an
UnderpricingModel
1. An Underpricing Model

The second model1 00 presented focuses on the IPO pricing process
and the manner in which securities are allotted to investors. In this
model, the leader's strategic actions play a major role in determining
the allotment mechanism's efficiency. Even during the process of interfacing companies' securities supply and investor demand, the
leader plays an important role generating enough costs to justify liability. Unlike previous studies, the present model focuses on the central players' strategic actions, and the gamut of the leader's functions method of a two-way information flow required to complete the IPO - on the one hand, information about the firm for prospectives, and on the other, pricing information for the leader, is
common practice all around the world.
100. See Sher, UnderwriterCivil Liabilityfor IPO's:An Economic Analysis, supranote 2, for a
comprehensive discussion of this model.
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insurance, bridging information gaps, marketing and distribution, and

post-IPO market support - which also have an effect on underwriter
actions. 10 The model also takes into account the fact that the issuing
process comprises information flows from the firm to the leader and
the investors, and also the other way around.
The model is based on a single system of selling securities in the
primary market, called the bookbuilding method.10 2 In primary markets around the world, there are two main groups of security selling
mechanisms. The first includes offerings complying with rules of
equality, to a certain degree, in receiving bids from the public and
distributing them among the various bidders. 10 3 This group also in-

cludes the auction method. The second group includes a mechanism
or working method of a single kind, allowing the leader discretion
(subject to various legal and conventional rules) in selecting the investors participating in the offering. This is the bookbuilding method
which is the basis of our model. In the U.S., most IPO's are conducted

in this method, and it is being increasingly used in exchanges all over
10 4
the world.
In the bookbuilding method, the leader interacts with prospective
clients during the marketing phase. In the road show, she presents the
company to prospective investors and receives indications, or informal

bids, for the amount and price of securities they expect to order.
These indications inform her about the way investors analyze the in101. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing underwriters' roles).
102. For a description of the method and its implications, see Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul
A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24
J. OF FIN. ECON. 343 (1989); Lawrence. M. Benveniste & Walid Y. Busaba, Bookbuilding vs.
Fixed Price:An Analysis of Competing Strategiesfor Marketing IPO's,32 J. of FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 383 (1997); Francesca. Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic
Allocation, 56 J. OF FIN. 2337 (2001), Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. OF FIN. 1105 (2000); Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the IPO Order
Book: Underpricing and Participation Limits with Costly Information, 65 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3
(2002).
103. For a description of the various methods included in this group and their implications, see
Bhagwan Chowdhry & Ann E. Sherman, InternationalDifferences in Oversubscriptionand Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings, 2 J. OF CORP. FIN. 359 (1996); Bhagwan Chowdhry & &
Ann E. Sherman, The Winner's Curse and International Methods of Allocating Initial Public
Offerings, 4 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 15 (1996); Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 102.
104. For a description of the global trend of increased use of the bookbuilding method, a
comparison of this method with others which include egalitarian rules (concerning the receipt of
bids from the public and their distribution among the bidders), such as the fixed price method,
and for a review of the first method's advantages, see. e.g., Tim Loughran, Jay R. Ritter & Krystian Rydqvist, Initial Public Offering: InternationalInsights, 2 PACIFIc-BASIN FIN. J. 165 (1994);
Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auctions with Endogenous
Entry, (Working Paper, December 2004) available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=276124 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2006); Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 102.
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formation provided in the road show, as well as their own private information. The information thus gleaned is used to determine the
offered securities' price and the way they are to be allotted to investors. The investors giving those indications are usually sophisticated,
regular clients. An unwritten agreement between the two parties
states that once the prospectus becomes effective and can be used to
order securities on offer, they do not retract their informal bid, while
she in turn rewards them in the allotment. Henceforth, these investors
will be called regular investors.
In discussing the bookbuilding method, the financing literature examines it mainly from the point of view of the IPO underpricing phenomenon. 105This phenomenon consists in an increase in share value in
the first trading session, after having registered for trading in the exchange, compared to their IPO evaluation. In developed economies,
the mean IPO underpricing rate is higher than 15%, with more than
60% in developing economies.
Of all the explanations suggested for the phenomenon, the present
model deals with asymmetric information costs, focusing on the type
of explanations related to the way the offering is marketed by the underwriters and to structural limitations, 1°6 not unlike the models designed by Benveniste and Spindt,l0 7and Sherman and
Titman. 10 8Benveniste and Spindt's model simulates the offering process in the bookbuilding method, which relies on a two-way relationship between the leader and the investors. According to Benveniste
and Spindt, this relationship allows the first to provide investors with
proprietary information about the company's value; receive their
"good" and "bad" private information, required for an "accurate"
IPO pricing; and to reward them by underpricing the offering and allotting a relatively higher percentage of the securities offered. The
105. For an overview of the underpricing as a global phenomenon, and for a review of the
various models suggested to explain it, within the extensive literature on the subject, see TIM
JENKINSON & ALEXANDER LJUNGOVIST, GOING PUBLIC, 64-138 (Oxford 2d ed. 2001). Jenkinson and Ljungqvist divide those models into three main categories: (1) asymmetric information
models; (2) models focusing on institutional explanations; and (3) models taking into account
considerations of ownership and control over the issuing companies. Id. For a review of the
possible reasons for that phenomenon. See also R. A. BREALEY & S. C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 414-416 (McGraw- Hill 6th ed. 2000); Steven A. Ross, ET AL., CORPORATE
503-509 (McGraw-Hill 5th ed., 1999); Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for IPO's: An
Economic Analysis, supra note 2.
FINANCE

106. For the various models based on partial information costs and focusing on the type of
explanations related to the way the offering is marketed by underwriters and to structural limitations, see JENKINSON & LIUNGQVIST, supra note 105, at 88-107.
107. Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 102.
108. Sherman & Titman, supra note 102.
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bookbuilding mechanism operates as a truth-telling verification mech-

anism: if it is revealed that the investors have not been cooperative,
opting for a strategic behavior of non-disclosure of real information,
the leader will erase them from her regular investors list.
Also worthy of note are models dealing with institutional explanations for the underpricing phenomenon and focusing on the underwriter's role of supporting the post-IPO price. In this context, the
leader can use various tools to reduce the risk entailed in the offering,
such as: (1) stabilization activitiesa0 9 (2) overselling of offered securi-

ties (being in a short position) and covering the difference by exercising her right to over-allot or by buying securities in the secondary
market,1 10 and (3) penalty bid."' In addition, the leader also acts as a
market maker in the offerings she manages.'1 2 One of the main explanations for underpricing according to these models, is that the leader
1 13
uses those tools to increase her own profits.
In the current model, regular investors differ from ordinary ones in
that they are constantly in touch with potential leaders who allow

them to take part in the bookbuilding process. Not any investor enjoys
the privilege of being included in the leader's contact list during the

bookbuilding process. To become regular, the investor must be (1) a
financial intermediary of some sort (such as a trust fund) or one of the
109. The leader can flow bids, at a price not higher than the offering price, for a certain period
after trade begins, so long as the securities are still being distributed, in order to support the
offering price (and so long as that option has been made explicit in the IPO prospectus).
110. The leader usually has the so-called "green shoe option" to purchase securities from the
issuing firm - up to 15% of the amount issued and at the offering price, within thirty days after
the offering date. Price-supporting actions are very common, and according to Asquith, Jones
and Kieschnick, they were carried out in about half of the offerings in the years 1982-1983. See
Daniel Asquith, ET AL., Evidence on Price Stabilization and Underpricingin Early IPO Returns,
53 J. OF FIN. 1759, 1765 (1998).
111. The leader can deny a selling group member's right to receive a commission in case his
customers rush to resell their recently acquired securities (these investors are dubbed "flippers"), or even avoid using that member's services in the future.
112. Based on NASDAQ data, in the post-offering days, the leader acts as a market maker for
about half the trade volume, and accumulates an average of 8% of the shares. See Katrina Ellis,
R.oni Michaely & Maureen O'Hara, 55 J. of Fin. 1039 (2000).
113. The following are some of the explanations suggested: Reena Aggarwal, Stabilization
Activities by Underwritersafter Initial Public Offerings, 55 J. OF FIN. 1075 (2000); Ellis, Michaely
& O'Hara, supra note 112; R. Raymond P. H. Fishe, How Stock FlippersAffect IPO Pricing and
Stabilization?, 37 J. of Fin. and Quantitative Analysis 319 (2002); Ekkehart Boehmer & Raymond P. H. Fishe, Do Underwriters Encourage Stock Flipping? A New Explanation for the Underpricing of IPOs, (Working Paper, 2000) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=228434 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2006); Ekkehart Boehmer & Raymond P. H. Fishe, UnderwriterShort Covering
in the IPO Aftermarket: A Clinical Study, (Working Paper, 2003) available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=278945 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006); Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of
Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, (Working Paper, 1999) available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=173248 (last visted Mar. 9, 2006).

480

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:451

leader's important customers, (2) financially sound, and (3) able to
evaluate companies for the purpose of issuing their stocks. Candidates
who meet those requirements will offer themselves for the job, if it is
included in their investment policies. Importantly, all regular investors
can become informed investors if they invest in collecting and evaluating the information. In the bookbuilding process, the leader contacts
her regulars, or to a substantial part of them, and presents the company to them (using the draft prospectus and road show). These in
turn assess the information and place their bids, which is part of their
demand curve.
The leader assesses public demand based on bids by regular investors stating their maximum price for securities ordered. According to
Cornelli and Goldreich, there are three types of bids, 1 14including two
types meeting this condition (stating maximum price): step bids and
limit bids. The maximum price informs the leader about the expected
pricing of the securities offered. The maximum price is the most important data gleaned by the leader from those two bid types. Therefore, from the leader's perspective, these bids have a similar value,
which is higher than that of less informative bids. We further assume
that the third type - strike bids - informs the leader about the regular
investors' demand curve (without price data).
In fact, the leader selects her regular investors in such quantity and
quality so as to include, in each offering, a certain number of investors
that will conduct analysis allowing them to inform her about pricing.
On the one hand, this number should be high enough to allow accurate evaluation. On the other hand, the number of those conducting
analysis in a certain offering shouldn't be too high, because of the
costs involved. Too many informed investors will limit the leader's maneuverability in allotting the stocks, because she would have to "repay" them for their investment in collecting and evaluating the
information.
The model answers two important questions: How does the leader's
strategic behavior affect the IPO price and the security allotment?
How does a law holding the leader liable affect this mechanism?
The answer to the first question is that in equilibrium, only some of
the regular investors evaluate the securities offered, to a degree allowing for efficiency in plotting the market demand curve. In equilibrium, the regular investors, both informed and non-informed, present
the leader with their real demand data (the price data according to
their evaluation or the demand data, respectively). Informed investors
114. Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 102.
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(regular investors who have invested in evaluating the information)
will not present demand data without price data (that is, will not pretend to be uninformed). This is because in this case, the compensation
received from the leader will not cover their costs. Informed investors
will also not mislead the leader about their evaluations. If they report
a lower price, the effect on the IPO pricing will be negligible, while
reducing their chances to take part in the offering. They will also not
report a higher price because, independently of their chances to participate, it will not be worth their while to buy offered stock at a price
higher than their true value.
The uninformed regular investors will present the leader with market data (strike bids) without price data. This is because a strategy of
not investing in analysis and participating in the IPO as informed investors is very costly. Moreover, uninformed investors will present
real demand data, for reasons similar to those of their informed
counterparts.
In equilibrium, the leader's strategic action achieves ample efficiency in accurately plotting the demand curve, on the one hand, while
preventing forbiddingly high costs of information analysis and verification by the regular investors, on the other. The leader's ability to
create an efficient equilibrium depends on her ability to reward the
regulars by underpricing and overallotment. This is done by means of
differential rewards to regulars who evaluate the company and inform
it of their evaluation, who receive a greater allotment than those who
do not (whose allotment is still higher than that of regular investors).
The answer to the second question is that holding the leader liable
can increase the allotment mechanism's efficiency when using the
bookbuilding method. Given the legal rule holding the leader liable,
regular investors can rely on the company's presentations during the
road show and reduce the costs of maintaining their due diligence and
information verification system.
Another conclusion derived from the model is that when the leader
is iaIeld liable, regular investors will match their demands to the highest
degree of certainty, ensured by the application of the legal rule in
question. Therefore, the leader, who plots the market demand curve
by means of extrapolation (i.e., using a forecast based on the regulars'
demand data), will be able to calculate a higher level of demand, due
to both increased demand by informed investors and the fact that the
extrapolation coefficients (the multipliers used to forecast the market
demand curve based on that of the regulars) will be higher. All these
contribute to an equilibrium in which a higher price is systematically
ensured for the offered securities, reflecting more accurately their full
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estimated value, while efficiency losses in the primary market security
allotment mechanisms are concomitantly reduced.
Moreover, although the effect of a law holding the leader liable for
misleading prospectus details is felt mainly in terms of regulating her
conduct in the IPO stage, it can also have a mitigating effect on her
strategic behavior in the post-IPO market. In other words, the law can
reduce efficiency costs resulting from the leader's strategic behavior,
since it limits her ability to profit by further increasing the underpricing ratio.
2.

Why a Negligence Rule Optimally Supports the Security
Allotment Mechanism

The second model's conclusions suggest two further advantages of
applying a negligence versus a strict liability rule. First, a negligence
rule can optimally restrain the leader's strategic behavior. According
to the previous description of the primary market's structure and the
way the leader operates within it, the leader takes a variety of strategic actions in order to maximize her profits. These actions affect certain parameters which are crucial to the allotment mechanism's
efficiency. Among other things, the leader selects the regular investors
who will maintain a system analyzing information about issuing firms
and report demand data. In equilibrium, the leader manages to optimize the investment in checking the information. Holding her liable
will reduce the costs of maintaining an information analysis and verification system and also increase the certainty as to the accuracy of the
market demand curve plotted by the leader. The efficiency of the
bookbuilding mechanism depends on the credibility of the leader's
claim to have exerted optimal effort, as perceived by the regular investors. A negligence rule will serve that purpose optimally, for the
reasons enumerated above. It poses a more credible threat to the
leader when it comes to carrying out due diligence, as it allows the
investors to scrutinize her activity. Thus, a negligence rule makes it
possible for the regular investors to reduce the costs of maintaining an
information analysis and verification system, as well as increasing
their certainty as to the accuracy of the market demand curve plotted
by the leader. Compared to a strict liability rule, it can significantly
reduce the primary market's indirect costs. A strict liability rule does
not support the bookbuilding mechanism to the same degree, since it
(1) does not allow institutional investors to increase their reliance on
the leader's presentations, (2) does not permit a similar reduction of
the costs of maintaining the information analysis and verification sys-
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tem, and (3) does not increase the credibility of the leader's demand
curve to the same extent.
Second, a negligence rule can better serve the post-IPO market in
dealing with the leader's strategic, profit-maximizing activities. This
liability imposition effect is indirect. One example is the possible use
of disclosure rules by the leader in order to influence the investors'
identity (for example, preferring flippers), in order to ensure higher
personal profits in the secondary market. As already mentioned, the
law can reduce the efficiency losses resulting from the leader's strategic behavior, since it reduces her ability to profit by further increasing
the underpricing ratio. Since it seems that a negligence rule can reduce the primary market underpricing ratio better than a strict liability rule, the former will make it difficult to deviate from equilibrium in
the pre-IPO market and will therefore better limit the leader's ability
to profit from strategic behavior in the post-IPO market.
C. Damage Distributionand Insurance: Efficiency Aspects
1. The Leader Is the Least Expensive Insurer
A law holding underwriters liable can help the leader exercise her
function as an IPO insurer. 115 The leader has an advantage relative to
the other participants in the offering, as she can obtain the best insurance policy. Her substantial economy of size, and the fact that she is a
repeated player in the market, ensure her ability to reduce insurance
premiums. She has the knowledge and the ability to formulate the
best insurance agreement with potential insurers. The leader's risk
aversion is lower than most participants due to her own large capital
and the considerable number of offerings in which she takes part.
Moreover, she is better able to bargain with potential insurers and has
a reputation that can be relied upon as a tool to reduce premiums.
Thus, it is obvious that the leader is the least expensive insurer of the
risk of misleading details being found in the IPO prospectus.
Creating an efficient insurance system in the primary market requires combined agreements between the issuing firms and its directors, the leader and the other underwriters, and it is the leader who's
in the best position to implement them. Holding her liable also solves
the under-insurance problem, which can result from the risk of omissions by the firm and its directors in terms of insurance cover. When
the policy is not effective for any reason, it is possible for the leader to
bear the responsibility. Importantly, the leader is also a "deep pocket"
115. For a comprehensive discussion of that subject, see Sher, Underwriter Civil Liability for
IPO's: An Economic Analysis, supra note 2.
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so that holding her liable increases the investors' chances of being
completely compensated for their damages. A leader's collapse is not
very likely since the law imposes the liability on the underwriter consortium as a whole and thus distributes the risk.
The leader's advantage in terms of risk distribution in public offerings is especially apparent in systematic risks.11 6 It seems that in practice, systematic and specific risks in IPO prospectuses cannot be
completely separated from one another. In this situation, only the
leader has the professional knowledge, the information, and the economies of size required in order to do so efficiencly, and thus distribute
risks optimally. Holding the leader liable may add to the efficiency of
the market risk distribution mechanism. Should she not be held liable,
she will have no incentive to insure the risk of misleading details in the
IPO prospectus. Without liability, the advantages stemming from insuring the risks involved will diminish, since the insurance will be in
far less skillful hands. For similar reasons, from the insurer's point of
view, the risk management procedure is much less costly when it is the
leader who is being supervised, rather than the issuing firm and its
directors.
2.

Why a Negligence Rule Optimally Supports Leader Insurance

In reference to the law's objective in terms of risk distributionand
insurance, holding the leader liable for negligence can improve the
efficiency of the market risk distribution mechanism. The present
analysis has provided several justifications for leader liability and imposing a negligence rule will increase those advantages in comparison
with a strict liability rule. Nevertheless, this effect is not as significant
as the effects in the area of directing behavior. On the one hand, a
negligence rule allows for better oversight of leader actions by potential insurers. The mechanism of exposing her actions (through litigation) also gives potential insurers a better idea about the leader's
actions. Thus, a potential insurer will be able to rely on the leader's
116. The question how risks become distributed in capital markets received several answers in
the financing theory literature. A basic answer was given in the form of the capital asset pricing
model, or CAPM. For a presentation of the model and its various extensions, see, e.g., ROBERT.
A. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 201-235 (Prentice Hall 5th ed. 2001) 201-235; WILLIAM SHARPE, ET. AL., INVESTMENTS, 227-55 (Prentice Hall 6th ed. 1999). The model
was heavily criticized, but its basic insight, that adding a stock to the market portfolio permits
distribution of the specific risk entailed in the new asset but does not permit distribution of the
systematic risk, is widely eccepted. According to that understanding, when we are talking about
a specific risk inherent in the new stock, it will be better distributed by the investors. A risk of
this kind is, for example, the difficulty of assessing the managers' skillfulness and reliability. But
when the issue is an inherent systematic risk, this cannot be distributed by diversifying the investors' portfolios.
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presentations concerning the quality of her due diligence with a higher
degree of certainty. This will enable him to harness the leader's reputation to the insurance premium pricing mechanism. A higher degree
leader reliability is also good for the leader herself. As already mentiond, it allows her to insure at a lower premium.
The mechanism of exposing leader actions (through litigation) also
gives other consortium managers and ordinary underwriters a better
idea about her actions. Since there is no practical means of revealing
raw company data to a large number of interested parties, litigation
allows the various members of the consortium to indirectly scrutinize
her actions. Furthermore, the custom of reports by the leader to ordinary underwriters, in the road show and through the so-called comfort
letters, has developed thanks to the liability for negligence imposed on
both parties. It may be that a strict liability standard does not make
those reports unnecessary. Be that as it may, a negligence standard
gives both parties an incentive to show that they have conducted
themselves properly: the leader - in testing for adequacy; and the
other underwriters - in scrutinizing the leader's testing procedure and
verifying that it has indeed been implemented according to accepted
standards. Imposing strict liability undermines a defense based on
both parties' examinations, thus considerably weakening the leader's
and other underwriters' incentives to conduct themsleves in the
above-mentioned manner.
D. Division of Welfare
As for the division of welfare, both in reference to the law's objective of directing the leader's behavior and from the point of view of
insurance and risk distribution, if the conclusions of the models and
analysis presented are accepted, it is reasonable to assume that the
company, the leader and the various investors each benefit from part
of the added efficiency resulting from holding the leader liable for
negligence. It is therefore expected that a negligence rule will also
have a better effect on the division of welfare among the IPO
participants.
V.
A.

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE COUNTERCLAIMS

Responding to Questions Raised in Literature Supporting
Strict Liability

The first counterclaims focus on arguments raised in the legal litarature supporting the imposition of strict liability on underwriters for
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the presence of misleading details in IPO prospectuses. Partnoy 17
suggested that profit-maximizing gatekeepers may prefer risking their
reputation for higher short-term profits. The present thesis describes
the offerings market such that a situation is created whereby leaders
are unable to harness their reputation to the task of convincing investors that they have indeed carried out the due diligence to an optimal
degree and that, therefore, the issuing company's prospectus includes
the optimal information for them. It is not short-term profits which
cause leaders to risk their reputation but their inability to substantiate
their actions during the IPO.
Partnoy believes that the very imposition of liability offers efficiency advantages, only that the negligence rule entials high costs,
both direct and indirect. The first stem from the uncertainty of legal
decisions and high litigation expenses, resulting from the fact that underwriters must take into consideration criteria determined by the
court. In our view, these criteria constitute an efficient mechanism for
reducing the direct costs.
As for indirect costs, Partnoy holds that a negligence rule creates a
preference for capital-raising in private offerings. However, the negligence rule, together with the adoption of several legal adjustments
that will prevent the leader from liability avoidance, will arguably promote public offerings. Moreover, there is a trend of applying the leaders' due diligence methods to private capital raisings as well. Leaders
who have acted as intermediaries in transactions of the former kind
tend to use the same methods and presentations also in private placement memorandums. This suggests a positive external effect of courtdetermined criteria in the IPO market (on the private offerings'
market).
Moreover, the selection of leaders by company executives is also
not biased so as to prefer too high-quality leaders. Quality leaders are
being selected in terms of various parameters, such as their relative
expertise in the issuing company's areas of business activity. However,
the claim that company executives ostensibly buy services that are
"too good" because of their risk aversion is incorrect. In fact, company executives try to contract with the optimal service provider
(sometimes by means of an auction); only the latter cannot "deliver"
8
due to IPO market failures.11
117. For detailed presentation of Partnoy's arguments, see supra notes 31-42 and 52-57 and
accompanying text.
118. For a comprehensive, recent empirical study about the way issuing firms and leaders
select one another in initial and seasonal public offerings, see C. S. Fernando, V. Gatchev & P.
A. Spindt, Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each Other, (Working Paper,
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As for the manner in which the law solves the primary market
problems, Partnoy believes that his suggested strict liability regime
would reduce the costs of litigation between the firm and its underwriters and allow them to divide the resulting profits between them.
However, these costs are relatively low, while the costs of misleading
details in the IPO prospectus are the most significant ones. Accordingly, imposing liability for negligence will ensure efficient cost reduction not least because it will deal better with the major cost in the
market-reduced demand for newly offered securities. It will thus allow
for a division of profits among all IPO market participants. Even the
primary market division of risk will be optimized following a negligence rule, with adjustments preventing leader "shirking", as opposed
to Partnoy's strict liability regime.
B.

A High Rate of Settlements in Suits Involving Underwriters,and
Low Underwriter Participationin the Suits and Settlements

A second set of counterclaims focuses on whether a high rate of settlements or low participation by underwriters as co-defendants in lawsuits related to misleading details in IPO prospectuses can undermine
the present thesis. One of the main reasons for applying the negligence rule is that it promotes exposure of the leader's working methods and actions concerning the IPO, thus optimally contributing to
solving the major problem in the market, which is the investors' lack
of information about the leader's actions. A possible refutation of the
present thesis is that the rate of settlements in lawsuits related to misleading details in IPO prospectuses is high, while the rate of leader
participation as co-defendants in such suits is law, so that in practice,
the leader's working methods and actions remain hidden.
The counterargumentinvolves the presentation of several data. Empirical findings show that in the U.S., the rate of settlements in classaction suits of this kind is high. Based on IPO data for the period
1990-1999, Choi1 19 found that following the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"),1 20 the rate of settlements reached
in such lawsuits fell from 83% to 75%. This change, however, does not
reflect increased exposure of leaders to judicial review, but rather le2004) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586964 (last visited Mar. 9,
2006).
119. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act?, (Working Paper, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558285 (last visited Mar.9,
2006).
120. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified as amended in sections of 15 U.S.C.)
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gal limitations on filing suits. 12 1 Empirical data are available also on
the rate of settlement. Based on the same data set, Choi, Bajaj,
Mazumdar, and Sarin 122 found that following the enactment of the
PSLRA, the rate of settled lawsuits declined from 58% to 26% out of
all class-action suits. The PSLRA thus ensures a relatively long exposure of defendants to the threat of legal claims and reviews. However,
this change can also be interpreted as resulting from the reduced
threat to potential defendants in any case of suspected presence of
misleading details in the IPO prospectus.
Another important phenomenon is the relatively low rate of classaction suits related to misleading details in IPO prospectuses in which
the suit is filed also against leaders. According to Bajaj, Mazumdar,
and Sarin,'123 based on the same data set, the post-PSLRA rate of
class-action suits with leaders as co-defendants (together with the issuing firm and its directors) is 6%.124 However, though their data seem
to support the existence of the phenomenon in question, they fail to
reflect the true rate of lawsuits of this kind. One indication for that is
found in Tinic's 1988 study: 125 according to IPO prospectuses of two
investment banks - Alex Brown & Sons, Inc. and L.F. Rothschild,
Unterberg & Towbin, Inc. - in 1986, they were defendants in 60 and
73 suits, respectively, involving public offerings they had underwritten.
An additional indication comes from searching the American legal
cases database. In a random sampling of Lexis.com data, we found
that in some 44% of the class-action suits of this kind, leaders were codefendants. 126 We therefore believe that the rate of lawsuits with leaders as co-defendants is higher than as stated by Bajaj, Mazumdar and
Sarin (6%), but lower than 50%.
Another significant phenomenon is that when a suit is filed against
leaders as co-defendants, their rate of participation in the settlement is
121. For lawsuits of this kind, where leaders have been sued as co-defendants, see, e.g., Kapps
v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2004); Cohen v. USEC, Inc., 70 Fed. Appx. 679
(4th Cir. 2003); Demaria McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2002);
Lilley v. Charren, 17 Fed. Appx. 603 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd., 308 F.
Supp.2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 96 CIV 3610, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14009 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
122. Mukesh Bajaj et al., Empirical Analysis: Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1009-1010 (2003).

123. Id. at 1007-1008.
124. Id.
125. Seha. M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. OF FIN
798-799 (1988).
Id. at 799 n.11.
126. We have found no significant difference between the 2000-2004 and the 1996-2000 samples in terms of the rate of leader participation as co-defendants in class-action suits for misleading details in IPO prospectuses.
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usually low. 127 In order to achieve that objective, the leaders pressure
the firm and its directors to forego their participation and show no
willingness to pay. Using this strategy, they manage to create a situation whereby, when a settlement is eventually reached between the
plaintiffs and the firm and its directors, the leaders join it at the last
minute, at low participation rates. Moreover, the leaders then demand
to implement the underwriting contract's indemnification clause.
Why do class-action plaintiffs agree to such low leader participation
in settlement payments, and why do they not attach the leader as a codefendant in all lawsuits? The answer is that the firm's liability for
misleading details in the IPO prospectus is at a higher level than that
of the leader's (strict liability), and is also more obvious and relatively
easy to prove. Moreover, the firm and its directors almost always have
professional liability insurance, making the "deep pocket" question irrelevant. The indemnification clause is also a disincentive. 128 Furthermore, under certain circumstances it may be that the law imposes
limits on the leader's participation rate. It seems that from the plaintiffs' point of view, attaching the leader to their suit might make its
management more difficult, without offering substantial benefits.
Why does the firm, its directors, and their professional liability insurer agree to the leader's low participation, and why do they not attach them as co-defendants in all lawsuits? The answer is that the firm
and its directors, on the one hand, and the insurance company, on the
other, face the same facts as the class action plaintiffs. They too realize
that the company's liability is at a higher level than the leader's and
also easier to prove. They too are deterred by the indemnification
clause and the legal limitations imposed under certain circumstances
on the leader's participation rate. Additionally, they are under enormous business pressure applied by the leader and the insurance companies, in particular, do not wish to seem as though they damage the
insured's business.
Nevertheless, for the reasons mentioned above, it should not be
concluded that it is inappropriate to hold the leader and the other
underwriters liable for misleading details in IPO prospectuses. It may
still be concluded, however, that underwriters are very skilled in reducing their exposure to the risks involved in lawsuits, including reputation risks. It is the law's responsibility to deal with the phenomena
described herein, which create a situation whereby the objective of
increasing social utility by holding leaders liable, in general, and liable
127. Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings are
Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 48-49 (1993).
128. Id. at 46-47.
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for negligence, in particular, is attained only partially, if at all. This is a
major justification for not allowing indemnification for leaders; for the
inappropriateness of deviating from the normal tort participation arrangements (jointly and severally): that special settlement rules must
be applied to the case where leaders are co-defendants; and that other
escape routes developed by the latter in order to reduce their exposure
to litigation risks, including risks to their reputation, must be blocked.
Each of these deserves a separate research.
C.

Escape Routes

A third group of questions concerns why leaders create the escape
routes described, and why they settle in a high rate of the lawsuits
filed against them as co-defendants. If exposing the leader's actions
contributes to social welfare, it must be in the leader's interest to use
this exposure in order to prove her quality and improve her reputation. The answer to these questions is related to many fundamental
issues regarding the behavior of individuals, in general, and of businesses, in particular. Professionals have a tendency to effect legislation
and to create mechanisms which will reduce their exposure to legal
claims. Physicians' and bankers' associations act this way. It seems
that sometimes they believe that reducing their exposure serves not
only their own good, but the social good; sometimes they believe it
only serves their own good, while sometimes they act this way although their own private welfare is reduced, together with social welfare (for example, due to union interests or to an overall strategy of
continuous action to reduce exposure). These aspects, however, are
outside the scope of the present article.
Furthermore, after the IPO, when a leader fears she may be sued
for missing details in the prospectus, she will try to reduce exposure,
and not increase it, even if she believes herself to be innocent. Apart
for the abovementioned behavioral reasons, the reason for that is the
uncertainty inherent in each lawsuit. Exposure may result in high costs
for the leader, including damage to her reputation. It is the extent of
those potential reputation costs, used in the models presented here to
leverage the desirable equilibrium, which causes the leader to open up
the legislative and market escape routes. The cost of the risk that the
court would be mistaken or that the market will misinterpret the results of the lawsuit is so high, that the leader will forego any benefit of
proving her quality. Moreover, the probability that the leader would
be able to prove her quality is very low, since in most cases a settlement is reached in which the plaintiffs are compensated for all their
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damages. Therefore, the leader will not be able to attain a decision
buttressing her reputation.
Since the leader knows in advance that should a lawsuit be filed, her
strategy will be reduced exposure, she prepares all possible escape
routes in advance, by effecting legislation and developing market
mechanism (in addition to the abovementioned behavioral aspects,
which propel professionals and their associations to adopt this
strategy).
D.

The Cogent Nature of Liability

Other important questions have to do with the cogent nature of liability. If it is indeed in the leader's interest that investors be informed
about her modus operandi,why is it necessary to hold her liable at all,
in general, and liable for negligence, in particular? Why not leave it to
the leader's discretion to state in the prospectus that she is liable for
the existence of misleading details therein, and willing to compensate
the investors for their damages if it is found that she has been negligent? Conversely, why not let the leader condition her liability for
negligence, in terms of such misleading details? Moreover, if transparency is in the leader's own interest, why do they tend not to reveal
their modus operandi in their prospectuses?
Some of the discussion of these important questions is beyond the
scope of this article. However, and without exhausting the discussion
of the need for cogent liability in the stock market, whether to hold
leaders liable and whether to hold them liable for negligence, some of
the principles and ideas underlying the justifications suggested by several authors for the imposition and enforcement of mandatory disclosure, and some of the above justifications for imposing liability for
negligence are also relevant in the present context. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, 129 a cogent rule of imposing and enforcing disclosure duties can reduce under-disclosure problems, for which there
may be three reasons. First, because a firm estimates that the information in question may serve other competing firms directly, or may help
investors considering to invest in competing firms. Second, the unfeasibility of charging a price for the production of comparative information. And third, the lack of appropriate incentives for creating the
least expensive disclosure format. As already mentioned, an unconditional negligence rule will contribute optimally to the creation of a
standard reporting format in prospectuses, which will allow inter-firm
comparison and will also be the least expensive. Furthermore, such a
129. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 290-292, 300-302.
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rule will optimally assist the law in cutting costs resulting from the
effect of the due diligence process on third parties.
The same applies to Rock's argument: 130 U.S. mandatory disclosure
laws are preferable to contractual solutions in resolving the various
problems faced by the issuing firm, in terms of disclosure content,
credibility, and enforceability. As previously mentioned, Rock believes these laws represent an efficient mechanism, both in terms of
standardization and by allowing adjustment of disclosure requirements over time. Should the leader be held unconditionally liable for
negligence, a similar adjustment mechanism could be created for the
level of due diligence.
The answers to the above questions focus on the claim that, without
a cogent law, the negligence rule's objective will not be served. The
same mechanism of "shirking," both by promoting legislation and by
various activities before and during the IPO, will operate in the same
way in each of the cases. This mechanism, in the form of contractual
conditioning of the type of liability so that strict liability, with an indemnification ceiling (instead of conditioned negligence), will apply.
For instance, it will have the following indirect results: the costs of the
effects of the due diligence procedure on third parties and the costs of
lack of adjustment of the testing format over time.
The same applies for the question of why the leader does not tend
to disclose her modus operandi in the prospectus. Although doing so
will serve the objective of exposing her activity, the same problems
concerning hidden action and the investors' inability to verify her
working methods and her conduct in the context of the specific IPO,
mean that such disclosure will not be very effective. The same applies
to the possibility that the leader hire an independent party to evaluate
her functioning. Even the activity of a financial body, the effectiveness
of whose scrutiny is low in any case, suffers from the hidden action
problem. On the other hand, the risk entailed by exposing the leader's
modus operandi in the prospectus or to an independent body is considerable. Such exposure might increase the risk involved in lawsuits
filed against her for a missing detail or for inaccurate portrayal of the
due diligence procedure. When such a lawsuit is filed, the leader's reputation will suffer considerably.

130. See Rock supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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VI.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE FOR OTHER
PARTICIPANTS IN THE ISSUING PROCESS

In the U.S., the scope of Section 11 liability varies among the various potential defendants: 131 all the undersigned in the registration
statement, including the issuing firm, its directors and underwriters,
132
are liable for all presentations in the registration statement.
Authors of expert opinions (lawyers, accountants, assessors, etc.
and herinafter "experts") are liable for the presentations included in
their own opinions. The level of Section 11 liability further varies
within the first group. While the issuing firm is held strictly liable, its
directors, the underwriters, and the experts, and anyone undersigning
the registration statement apart for the firm, will be held liable unless
entitled to one of the defences enumerated in Section 11(b). The latter's main available defence is that stipulated in Section 11(b)(3), according to which those seeking to be relieved of their liability have to
show that following reasonable investigation, they have had reason to
believe, and indeed believed, that no misleading detailed had been
included in the registration statement. In sum, the liability standard
imposed on the issuing firm's underwriters and directors is negligence,
while that imposed on the firm itself is strict liability.
The present thesis supports the appropriateness of holding the issuing firm and its directors liable for negligence, as well, for the following two reasons: First,the justifications for imposing a negligence rule
on the leader are also partially applicable to the firm and its directors.
They too are exposed to the same problem: their inability to convince
the investors that they have taken the optimal steps to ensure provision of all relevant information. Although the firm and its directors
are not well-known players in the stock market, they have an interest
in acquiring a reputation that will enable them to raise capital efficiently in the future. A law holding the firm and its directors liable for
131. For a brief review of the issue of liability according to § 11, see supra note 5 and the
accompanying text. For a legislative history of § 11, see references in LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, SUPRA note 12, Vol. IX, at 4247-4248 & n. 135;
LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION supra note 12 at 911 (1998 Supp.). For
an analysis of the section's componenets, the development of legal decisions and various
problems related to the imposition of liability based on this section, including the indemnification arrangements problem, See & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 1002-1013, 1159-1154; LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGLULATION,.Vol. IX, at 4246-4278, Vol. X, at 4685-4701; LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION at 911-916, 984-985 (1998 Supp.); COX, ET. AL. SECURITIES REGULATION, 228-29, 589-621 (Aspen 1997); and HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 12 at 328-349.
132. See Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding underwriter liable under § 11).
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negligence can play a major role in exposing their own modus operandi as well. In this case, too, a strict liability rule will prevent judicial
review of their activity.
Second, a strict liability rule imposed on those liable for all prospectus presentation (under U.S. law, it is the issuing firm) is one of the
reasons for the reduced effectiveness of holding leaders liable for negligence. This is because, as already mentioned, it is one of the factors
enabling leaders to develop escape routes. Strict liability is one of the
reasons for plaintiffs' tendency not to press charges against leaders. It
is also one of the reasons for the effectiveness of the indemnification
threat. Furthermore, strict liability is one of the explanations for the
relative ease in which issuing firms and their liabiliy insurance companies can be persuaded to settle. It is also one explanation for the situation whereby the court is not required to look into the part played by
the leader in causing the missing detail to be included in the prospectus. Only a rule imposing a uniform standard of negligence on all parties liable for all misleading details in the IPO prospectus will require
the court and the parties to the litigation, when bargaining for a settlement, to exmine each party's conduct and contribution to the existence of the misleading detail in the prospectus.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The thesis presented offers several justifications for the appropriateness of imposing a negligence rather than a strict liability rule on
the leader and other underwriters of initial public offerings (IPO's)
when misleading details are found in the IPO prospectus. As for applying the thesis to the firm and its directors, there are justifications
for holding them liable for negligence as well.
Can the thesis, that the leader should be held accountable for negligence in view of the need to use the court to expose his modus operandi and his specific actions concerning the IPO, be applied to other
areas as well? Can the implications of extending the thesis to the first
group of potential defendants - the issuing firm and its directors - be
relevant in additional areas? These questions require further research.
One example is the issue of the liability of medical institutions for
acts of commission and omission by medical staffs hired to carry out
operations. Facially, it seems justified to extend the thesis under these
circumstances. Thus, in an analogy to one of the justifications for
holding leaders liable, the common denominator between the cases is
that medical staffs are incapable of convincing their potential customers, the patients, that they implement optimal working methods, and
that they have done so in a specific case. Holding the medical institu-
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tion liable for thir actions (rather than only for issues under its contractual control, such as the quality of the surgical equipment) may
solve the problem. The institution's reputation is not enough to deal
with the problem, since the quality of its oversight is also impossible to
assess. Holding it liable for negligence will compel the court to inquire
whether it has carried out the (medical) "due diligence" in an optimal
manner. A strict liability rule forgoes such judicial inquiry.
The justifications for a negligence rule may weaken should the rationale of liability in general be weakened. In this context,
Langevoort 133 claimed that, now that technological allow IPO's to be
implemented in new ways, the investment bank's gatekeeper function
becomes less significant. In his view, it would not be advisable, in such
cases, to hold them legally liable and require that they carry out adequacy tests.134 But, should significant changes occur in the way that
IPO's are conducted, the justfications for liability will also have to be
re-examined. Thus, the leader has an advantage in terms of developing financial devices designed to circumvent financial intermediaries
in the primary market. Should such devices be developed, it would
require reexamining the legal situation.
In sum, both underwriters and the firm, as well as its directors,
should be held liable for negligence when misleading details are found
in the IPO prospectus. The following questions require further studies. The first involves the leader's escape routes. What are the implications of the present thesis and what is the appropriate law it advocates
in ancillary areas: indemnification arrangements, participation arrangements, settlements and appropriate rules of managing the procedure and reaching a court decision in claims against leaders.
Note that regarding settlements involving the leader, the thesis
presented above suggests that, prima facie, it is not at all obvious that
settlements with the leader should be encouraged. Despite the legal
system's interest in reducing its costs, the utility loss, resulting from
the inability to achieve the objectives of applying the negligence rule,
should also be taken into account. The reason is the escape routes
described above. The common case where settlements are reached in
which the leader's participation is relatively meager, and the large
133. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, supra
note 25. See also Langevoort, Markets and Information Gathering in an Electronic Age: Securities
Regulation in the 21st Century: Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced
Investing, supra note 25.
134. Elsewhere, Langevoort suggested that § 11 liability be reformulated with alleviated requirements of underwriters in shelf offerings, but without any change in the liability imposed on
IPO underwriters. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuos Disclosure Environment, supra note 25, at 67.
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number of cases where they are not co-defendents (among other reasons, because they are expected to participate insignificantly), suggest
that encouraging settlements may exacerbate the problem.
On the other hand, the thesis presented does not suggest that settlements are to be avoided at any cost. Should the law be redesigned so
as to block escape routes which erode the efficiency of imposing a
higher degree of liability, it will be of interest to discuss the question
of reaching efficient settlements. Assuming leader "shirking" can be
avoided in this manner, the compensation rates imposed on leaders
are expected to increase, as well as the rate of lawsuits in which they
are co-defendants. In this case, it will certainly make sense to ask,
what is the rate of lawsuits in which it is efficient for a settlement to be
reached with the leader as well (in view of the judicial system's interest, etc.).
If the leader's modus operandi is judicially reviewed in a large
enough portion of the cases, the question of efficient settlements will
thus become relevant. In this case, the question will be how to design
the law so as to prevent evasion of the discussion concerning division
of liability, and what mechanisms must be added in order to ensure
that the utility in terms of the leagal discussion is not outweighed by
the negative utility of forgoing complete disclosure of the leader's modus operandi and particular actions. One of the pertinent questions in
this case will be, what oversight should the court apply to the parties
to the suggested settlement. Another question is whether the parties
should deliver a detailed report to the investors concerning the existence of misleading details in the prospectus, as a condition for the
court's acquiescence to the suggested settlement.
Importantly, on the face of it, preventing the leader from taking
part in settlements seems inefficient. This is because it might entail
high costs, as it might prevent any lawsuits from being filed against
him. It is also worthy to note, as the thesis suggests, that the court
should consider using its insights to design procedure management
rules and the manner in which decisions are formulated. At first
glance, it seems desirable that the court devote a special effort to expose the leader's modus operandi as part of the legal procedure, and
also make sure that its findings in that matter be fully articulated in its
decision.

